Decision on the European Commission’s interactions with interest representatives of the tobacco industry (case OI/6/2021/KR)

This inquiry concerned the European Commission’s compliance with the provisions on tobacco lobbying, as set out in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) of the World Health Organization. In particular, the Ombudsman assessed how the Commission ensures the transparency of its interactions with the tobacco industry.

The Ombudsman’s previous work had demonstrated how the Commission’s Directorates-General for Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) and Taxation (DG TAXUD) comply with the obligations in this area. This inquiry sought to assess how the Commission complies with its obligations across all departments and concerning all Commission staff members.

In the course of the inquiry, the Ombudsman shared with the Commission her preliminary findings. She signalled that the Commission’s failure to take a consistent approach across all its departments to complying with its obligations concerning the transparency of interactions with tobacco industry representatives constitutes maladministration. This included the failure to keep and make available minutes of meetings with tobacco interest representatives, as well as the failure to ensure a systemic assessment, across all directorates-general, as to whether potential meetings with tobacco industry representatives are needed.

In its reply, the Commission restated its standard approach to lobbying transparency and referred to the additional measures taken by DG SANTE and DG TAXUD, which existed prior to the Ombudsman’s inquiry. The Ombudsman therefore upheld her finding that the failure by the Commission to ensure a comprehensive approach across all its departments to transparency of meetings with representatives of the tobacco industry constitutes maladministration.

The Commission added, however, that it will instruct its management to conduct an assessment of the risk of exposure to the tobacco industry. The Ombudsman welcomed this commitment as a sign that things might improve in the future. The Ombudsman will write to the Commission, at the start of 2024, with the points she urges it to communicate to its directors-general, heads of service, and heads of cabinets as they conduct this assessment. The Ombudsman will also ask the Commission to report back by 30 June 2024 on the outcome of the assessment and the progress made on that basis.

Background to the inquiry

1. The consumption of tobacco products is widely recognised as a major threat to public health. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), there are 1.3 billion tobacco users around the world today. Tobacco addiction is responsible for killing more than 8 million people each year, including 1.3 million non-smokers who are exposed to second-hand smoke. Nearly half of all children breathe air polluted by tobacco smoke and 65 000 children die each year due to illnesses related to second-hand smoke.[1]

2. According to the European Commission, tobacco consumption is the single largest avoidable health risk, and the most significant cause of premature death in the EU, responsible for nearly 700 000 deaths every year. Around 50% of smokers die prematurely (on average 14 years earlier)[2].

3. The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) entered into force in 2005, and both the EU and its Member States are contracting parties to it. The FCTC is thus legally binding upon them.[3] Full implementation of the FCTC is part of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

4. Among the obligations set out in the FCTC, Article 5(3) requires the EU to protect its public health policies from “commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry”. The “tobacco industry” includes manufacturers, importers and distributors of tobacco products and processors of tobacco leaf, as well as interest representatives who lobby on their behalf. All of these private interests have as a goal to generate profit, directly or indirectly, from tobacco products.

5. Although Article 5(3) focuses on public health, the WHO subsequently specified, in its 2008 Guidelines for implementation of Article 5(3)[4] that “tobacco industry interference (...) cuts across a number of tobacco control policy areas”. As a consequence, the Guidelines recommend that “all branches of government” should be made aware of industry efforts to interfere with policies, and that interactions with the tobacco industry should be limited to what is strictly necessary for effective regulation. The Guidelines also emphasise that, when such interactions occur, it is crucial that they are conducted transparently. This entails, for example, public hearings, public notice of interactions, as well as making public any meeting minutes.

6. However, there are concerns that many signatories of the FCTC, including the EU[5], have encountered difficulties in protecting their decision-making processes from tobacco industry interference. As such, compliance with the obligations under Article 5(3) has been assessed as incomplete. Civil society organisations have found it to be among the FCTC articles with the lowest implementation rate.[6] In 2022, the European Parliament called for the rapid and complete implementation of the FCTC.[7]

7. The European Ombudsman previously (in 2016) assessed the European Commission’s implementation of the FCTC.[8] At the time, the Ombudsman commended the Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) for its proactive transparency policy. This policy requires the automatic publication of details of all meetings with the tobacco industry at all levels. However, the Ombudsman expressed regret that the Commission did not apply this transparency requirement more broadly. In other departments, only meetings held by high-ranking officials (commissioners, members of their cabinets, and directors-general) were listed, and any related minutes would be disclosed only upon request. This led the Ombudsman to close the inquiry with a finding of maladministration, as she considered that the Commission had failed to apply across all of its services the stricter transparency rules required under international law.

8. In 2021, in a context of the revision of EU tobacco legislation, the Ombudsman wrote to the Commission on this matter, calling for the Commission to proactively make public all information on interactions between the Commission and the tobacco industry. [9] Later in 2021, the Ombudsman welcomed the decision from the Commission Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs (DG TAXUD) to follow DG SANTE in implementing a proactive transparency policy on its staff’s interactions with tobacco interest representatives, at all levels. DG TAXUD’s decision showed that the enhanced transparency policy in relation to tobacco control should not be limited to the department that deals primarily with public health policies.[10]

9. In its reply, the Commission explained that it had reinforced its general ethics and transparency framework and reminded its high-ranking officials of the FCTC obligations. This strengthened general framework, the Commission argued, would suffice to guarantee full compliance with Article 5(3). As a consequence, the development of specific guidelines on interactions with the tobacco industry was not envisaged.

10. Against that background, the Ombudsman decided to open this own-initiative inquiry.

The inquiry

11. The Ombudsman opened an own-initiative inquiry to assess how the Commission ensures that its interactions with tobacco interest representatives are transparent.

12. In the course of the inquiry, the Ombudsman inspected documents held by the Commission concerning interactions with tobacco representatives between 2020 and 2021. This included requests for public access to documents related to such interactions and guidance on tobacco industry interactions shared within the Commission across its departments.

13. The Ombudsman inquiry team also met with representatives of the Commission to discuss issues arising from the inspection of documents.[11] In addition, the Ombudsman sought further documents and clarifications from the Commission arising from the meeting and from the documents inspected, which the Commission provided in a number of subsequent exchanges.

14. Based on these exchanges, the Ombudsman issued a letter setting out her preliminary findings, including of maladministration, to the Commission on 14 April 2023.[12] On 7 December 2023, the Commission finally provided the Ombudsman with a reply, incurring a considerable delay, despite various reminders.[13]

15. The following sections present the Commission’s arguments and the Ombudsman’s assessment with a particular focus on transparency of interactions with tobacco interest representatives and assessment of necessity when interacting with the tobacco industry.

16. During the inquiry, the Ombudsman also received input from several ‘stakeholder’ organisations, including two representatives of tobacco industry, namely Tobacco Europe and British American Tobacco[14], as well as the public interest group ‘Smokefree Partnership’.[15]

Transparency of interactions with tobacco interest representatives

Arguments presented by the Commission

17. The Commission reaffirmed its commitment to the principles and obligations deriving from the FCTC, with which it said it fully complied. This commitment, it said, is illustrated by Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, in which the Commission set the objective of creating a tobacco-free generation by 2040.[16]

18. The Commission’s approach to the protection of its policies from interference from the tobacco industry has two main components:

  • First, the Commission applies its general regime on transparency and lobbying to interactions with the tobacco industry. This regime was developed in 2014, and applies throughout Commission departments and policy areas. It requires publishing on the Commission’s websites certain details on all meetings held by commissioners, members of their cabinets (private offices) and directors-general with interest representatives. On a case-by-case basis and upon request, the Commission may also disclose the minutes from these meetings (as well as other relevant documents) to the public in accordance with the EU legislation on public access to documents held by EU institutions.[17] Moreover, the Commission requires those representatives to meet only interest representatives that are registered in the Transparency Register.[18]
  • Second, two Commission directorates-general (DGs), namely DG SANTE, which holds the primary responsibility in setting and implementing public health policies with respect to tobacco control, and DG TAXUD, apply additional arrangements when interacting with representatives of the tobacco industry. In terms of transparency, these DGs proactively publish on a dedicated website the list and minutes of such meetings held by staff members at all levels, including below the level of directors-general.

19. The Commission considers that this twofold approach to transparency adequately protects its decision-making process from tobacco industry interference. It also considers that this regime is proportionate to achieving the FCTC’s goals. The Commission stated that only DG SANTE and DG TAXUD take a proactive approach to transparency, as other departments only have occasional meetings with tobacco interest representatives, and therefore are sufficiently protected through the general transparency regime. When in doubt, they can consult DG SANTE, which provides them with advice upon request.

20. On the related question of whether minutes are systematically taken during meetings with interest representatives, the Commission said that, while minutes are not compulsory for all meetings, a written record of meetings is recommended where related to important information. These records must be registered in the Commission’s document management system. On the content of minutes, the Commission stated that there is no standard practice of how to take minutes, but that staff were usually advised to use their common sense based on the objective that minutes should be both factual and useful, while respecting data protection considerations.

21. In its reply to the Ombudsman’s preliminary findings, the Commission said it will now instruct its directors-general, heads of service, and heads of cabinets, to conduct an assessment of the exposure of their services to lobbying by tobacco representatives in the context of health policies and policies related to tobacco control. In case of likely exposure, those senior Commission staff should ensure that their own staff members make public minutes of meetings with tobacco representatives at a designated place on their website.

The Ombudsman’s assessment

22. The Ombudsman notes the Commission’s acknowledgement of the importance of ensuring transparency in its interaction with the tobacco industry. This is key, because transparency is an essential aspect in the implementation of Article 5(3) of the WHO FCTC. In a recent preliminary ruling,[19] the Court of Justice of the EU has reminded the EU that the guidelines for interpretation of Article 5(3) “have been adopted by consensus, including by the European Union and its Member States”, and that they “indeed recommend that interactions with the tobacco industry should be limited and transparent”. However, while this shared goal of increased transparency ought to be emphasised, it is equally important to assess whether and how it is implemented concretely.

23. The FCTC defines tobacco control as referring to a range of comprehensive measures to protect people from the effects of tobacco consumption and second-hand tobacco smoke. The measures are to (i) protect people from exposure to tobacco smoke, (ii) ban tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, (iii) ban tobacco sales to minors, (iv) require health warnings on tobacco packaging, (v) promote tobacco cessation, and (vi) increase tobacco taxation, for example.[20] Therefore, it is important to ensure consistent proactive transparency across all parts of the Commission whose activities may include any of these areas.

24. The Ombudsman’s inquiry demonstrated that numerous Commission directorates-general (beyond DG SANTE and DG TAXUD) had meetings with tobacco interest representatives, including Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI), Climate Action (DG CLIMA), Environment (DG ENV), Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA), Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW), Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE), Neighbourhood and Enlargement (DG NEAR), Trade (DG TRADE), as well as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). Some of these departments also asked for advice from DG SANTE about how to best handle meeting requests from the tobacco industry, thus illustrating that compliance with the FCTC is a concern shared across different sections of the Commission.

25. The Ombudsman’s inquiry also demonstrated that these meetings not only took place with senior staff within the Commission (commissioners, heads of cabinets and directors-general), but also with staff at lower levels.[21] This illustrates the gap in the Commission’s current transparency framework, where there is no requirement to make proactively public the existence and/or minutes of such interactions unless they involve DG SANTE or DG TAXUD. While it remains possible to submit a request for public access to documents relating to these meetings, this is made more difficult if the existence of the meeting is not known.[22]

26. Finally, the Ombudsman inquiry showed that minutes do not seem to exist for a number of meetings Commission staff had with tobacco interest representatives. These meetings are listed in the annex to this decision. The inspection further revealed that some of the existing minutes do not provide a meaningful account of the content of the meeting. Instead, several minutes included only a short summary of the general topic of the discussion and the statements made by Commission staff. In the Ombudsman’s view, they failed to record the main discussion points and the outcome(s) of the meetings in question.

27. To prevent the tobacco industry from seeking to lobby different areas of the Commission when a Commission department becomes less amenable to its demands, it is crucial that proactive transparency requirements are applied across all departments and in respect of all staff levels. This is in line with the WHO FCTC Secretariat recommendation’s that “it is best when [Article 5(3)] protective measures are applied government-wide (...) [to] stop the industry from utilising non-health departments to represent its interests to underline or weaken tobacco control”.[23] Only through such a comprehensive approach will the Commission be able to fully guarantee that its decision making is protected.

28. Meaningful record-keeping is a precondition for transparency. If EU institutions are to be accountable for their actions, they first need to keep records of those actions. Only by doing so can such information later be reviewed by individuals or organisations that may seek to hold the institutions to account. Where meetings concern interaction with tobacco industry representatives, transparency obligations are even more important, as made clear in the FCTC Guidelines[24]. The Ombudsman is therefore of the view that minutes should be produced for all meetings with tobacco interest representatives.

29.  In light of the above, the Ombudsman considers that the Commission is not fully complying with its obligations concerning the transparency of tobacco lobbying. The Ombudsman therefore upholds her finding that the failure by the Commission to ensure a comprehensive approach across all its departments to transparency of meetings with representatives of the tobacco industry constitutes maladministration.

30. The Ombudsman welcomes, as a sign that things might improve in the future, the Commission’s commitment in reply to her preliminary findings to further assess how exposed its services are to lobbying by tobacco representatives. The Ombudsman will write to the Commission, at the start of 2024, with the points she urges it to communicate to its directors-general, heads of service, and heads of cabinets as they conduct this assessment. The Ombudsman will also ask the Commission to report back by 30 June 2024 on the outcome of the assessment and the progress made on that basis.

Assessment of ‘necessity’ when interacting with tobacco interest representatives

31. The Ombudsman asked the Commission to explain how it complied with another aspect of the Guidelines on the implementation of Article 5(3), namely that “parties should interact with the tobacco industry only when and to the extent strictly necessary to enable them to effectively regulate the tobacco industry and tobacco products”. This question arose as part of the exchanges the Ombudsman inquiry team had with Commission representatives, where it appeared that necessity checks were sometimes conducted by staff prior to meetings with tobacco representatives. However, it was not clear whether this was a systematic practice or not.

Arguments presented by the Commission

32. In reply to the Ombudsman, the Commission stated that it has no specific procedure or rule on assessing whether meetings with representatives of the tobacco industry are necessary.

33. The Commission pointed to the existing cross-cutting rules on ethics and conduct that apply to EU staff and which cover relations with stakeholders and set binding obligations. They ensure that the principles of independence, impartiality, objectivity and loyalty are applied in the EU administration. The Commission also stated that it has endorsed the Ombudsman’s ‘Practical recommendations for public officials’ interaction with interest representatives’[25] and has requested its staff to apply them diligently. Furthermore, relevant training on ethics and staff conduct is provided to staff upon recruitment and on a continuous basis. Based on this, the Commission said its staff are in a position to make informed judgments, including on assessing whether meetings with tobacco industry representatives are necessary, in order to avoid any risk of conflicts of interest as well as any risk of compromising the image and reputation of the Commission. When in doubt, staff should consult their line management and ethics services.

34. Finally, the Commission said that DG SANTE, for its part, has reduced its interactions with the tobacco industry to those that are strictly necessary for regulatory purposes and has recommended that other Commission departments adopt the same approach.

The Ombudsman’s assessment

35. The WHO’s Guidance on Article 5(3) of the FCTC states, in recommendation 2.1, that interactions with the tobacco industry should take place ”only and to the extent when strictly necessary” to enable effective regulation of the tobacco industry and tobacco products. Since 2011, DG SANTE has required its staff to conduct a formal assessment regarding the necessity of meetings with representatives of the tobacco industry.[26] The Ombudsman also identified an instance where DG AGRI considered the requirement of necessity in deciding whether a Commissioner should meet with tobacco industry representatives. In that case, DG AGRI relied on FCTC obligations, including recommendation 2.1, to reject the meeting request.[27]

36. The Court of Justice of the EU recently reiterated the need to limit interactions with the tobacco industry in the context of setting the emissions level of cigarettes. [28] The Court stated that Article 5(3), does not prohibit every interaction with the tobacco industry, but is intended “to prevent the tobacco control policies of the parties to the convention from being influenced by that industry’s interest”, and reiterated that the Guidelines “indeed recommend that interactions with the tobacco industry should be limited and transparent”. The Court noted that, while the Guidelines do not themselves have binding force, they are intended to assist the contracting parties in implementing the binding provisions of the FCTC. The Court further noted that those guidelines were adopted by consensus, including with the support of the EU.[29]

37. The Ombudsman considers that only by conducting a case-by-case assessment of whether a potential meeting is strictly necessary for regulatory purposes, can the Commission ensure that it is taking an informed decision and one which is in line with the spirit of the FCTC. The Ombudsman thus considers the Commission should ensure that it puts in place a systemic approach to prior assessment of the necessity of meetings with representatives of the tobacco industry. Ideally, such a systemic approach should define the modalities to be fulfilled, or documentation to be provided, to evaluate whether a meeting with tobacco representatives should take place. The Ombudsman will make a suggestion to address this.

38. Finally, the Ombudsman notes that limiting the interaction with the tobacco industry is not the only requirement of Article 5(3) of the FCTC. The FCTC also requires governments and public bodies to ensure that any interaction with the tobacco industry is carried out in such a way so as to avoid any perception of partnership or cooperation. In practice, this means that EU civil servants should refrain from participating in events or on platforms involving policy aims or debates, where the tobacco industry openly or covertly is either a sponsor or member.

Conclusion

Based on the inquiry, the Ombudsman closes this case with the following conclusion:

The failure by the Commission to ensure a comprehensive approach across all its departments to transparency of meetings with representatives of the tobacco industry constitutes maladministration. This includes the Commission’s failure to ensure a systematic assessment, across all directorates-general, as to whether potential meetings are needed with representatives of the tobacco industry.

The European Commission will be informed of this decision.

Suggestions for improvement

The Ombudsman welcomes the Commission’s commitment to further assess how exposed its services are to lobbying by tobacco representatives. This is an important first step. The Ombudsman will write to the Commission, at the start of 2024, with the points she urges it to communicate to its directors-general, heads of service, and heads of cabinets as they conduct this assessment. The Ombudsman will then ask the Commission to report back by 30 June 2024 on the outcome of the assessment and the progress made on that basis.

The Commission should put in place a formal procedure for assessing the necessity of meetings with the tobacco industry representatives, before such meetings take place, and ensure that this is consistently applied across all its services.

 

Emily O'Reilly
European Ombudsman


Strasbourg, 19/12/2023

 

Annex - Details of meetings for which minutes are missing

Service

Meeting

Date

Commission’s reply in which the meeting was declared

Notes

ENV

Stakeholder workshops held by a contractor for the implementation of the SUP directive (notable participants: ESTA/Poeschl Tobacco; Tobacco Europe/BAT/PMI)

25/02/2020

Reply 2 (08/2022)

 

ERCEA

Unscheduled meeting between former ERC President and CEO of Philip Morris during World Economic Forum

01/2020

Reply 2 (08/2022)

Unclear if unscheduled meeting refers to the panel discussion or other (no more information in the Commission’s reply)

FISMA

Tobacco Europe AISBL with Cabinet member of former Commissioner responsible for EU-UK future trade relations

22/07/2020

Reply 1 (02/2022)

 

GROW, TRADE and TAXUD

Meeting with ECMA

12/02/2021

Reply 2 (08/2022)

 

Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight

PMI meeting with Cabinet member of the Vice-President of the Commission for Interinstitutional Relations on Working priorities of the new European Commission

23/01/2020

Reply 1 (02/2022)

While the Commission did not submit the minutes in response to the inspection request, the Ombudsman is aware of them via a request for public access (GESTDEM 2020/2580)

MOVE

ETRC with former Director-General of DG MOVE on virtual arrivals duty free

06/11/2020

Reply 1 (02/2022)

 

NEAR

PMI meeting with Cabinet member of the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement on the occasion of the Breakfast with institutional and economic stakeholders organised by Comin & partners

11/09/2020

Reply 1 (02/2022)

 

OLAF

Meeting with ETRC on FCTC Protocol implementation

14/04/2021

Reply 2 (08/2022)

 

Meeting with A1 Fakher on illicit trade in water pipe tobacco

12/10/2021

 

TAXUD

ETCR with the Director-General of DG TAXUD on the occasion of a Belgium videoconference on excise and VAT rules

27/11/2020

Reply 1 (02/2022)

 

TAXUD

Meeting between TAXUD and cabinet of the Commissioner for Economy with JUUL Labs Chief Regulatory Officer

29/04/2020

Reply 01/2023

No minutes but a follow-up email from JUUL (a producer of electronic cigarettes) with position paper on Tobacco Product Directive

 

 

[1] See for more facts on the hazards related to tobacco use: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/tobacco.

[2] https://health.ec.europa.eu/tobacco/overview_en

[3] The EU concluded the Convention by Council Decision 2004/513/EC of 2 June 2004, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2004_213_R_NS005.

[4] Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2008), available at: https://fctc.who.int/publications/m/item/guidelines-for-implementation-of-article-5.3.

[5] Hawkins and Holden (2018), “European Union implementation of article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control”, Globalization and Health, 14:79

[6] Glahn et al (2018), “Tobacco control achievements and priority areas in the WHO Europe Region: a review”, Tobacco Prevention and Cessation, 15.

[7] See point 13 of the ‘Report on strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer – towards a comprehensive and coordinated strategy’, which is available here: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2022-0001_EN.html.

[8] 852/2014/LP, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/73774.

[9] SI/1/2021/KR, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/correspondence/en/144267.

[10] See the Ombudsman’s speech on the ‘Importance of FCTC Article 5.3 in the EU context’, available here: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/speech/en/139671.

[11] Report on the meeting of the European Ombudsman inquiry team with the European Commission’s representatives, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/inspection-report/en/162733

[12] Preliminary findings in OI/6/2021/KR, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/preliminary-finding/en/168640

[13] The Commission asked for two one-month extensions and ultimately replied on 7 December 2023, two months beyond the extended deadline. See the reply of the Commission to the Ombudsman’s preliminary findings here: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/correspondence/179325.

[14] Stakeholder submission from Tobacco-Europe - https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/correspondence/179328. Stakeholder submission from British American Tobacco EU Office: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/correspondence/179326.

Stakeholder submission from Smokefree Partnership: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/doc/correspondence/179327.

[15] Letter from Tobacco Europe to the European Ombudsman in the context of the inquiry concerning the transparency of the European Commission's interactions with representatives of the tobacco industry, available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/correspondence/en/171505

[16] Communication from the Commission on Europe’ Beating Cancer Plan (COM(2021)44 final), point 3.2, paragraph 4, footnote 26, page 9., available at: https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-02/eu_cancer-plan_en_0.pdf

[17] Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R1049

[18] The transparency register is a database that lists organisations that try to influence the law-making and policy implementation process of the EU institutions. It was established by the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2021.207.01.0001.01.ENG.

[19] Case C-160/20, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=184A5AC2A84062071234501852AE1054?text=&docid=254381&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=290831.

[20] See: https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/tobacco-and-the-who-framework-convention-on-tobacco-control#.

[21] This was the case in a meeting of DG TRADE with tobacco interest representatives on 5 October 2020, and in another meeting of DG FISMA with a tobacco company on 17 June 2021. In both cases, Commission participants were all below director-general level (senior experts, policy officers, policy coordinators, team leaders, and heads of units). This is in accordance with their current job descriptions, as indicated on the Who's Who directory, which could be at variance with their positions in 2020 and 2021 at the time of the meeting. In general, there were several meetings listed by the Commission that had not been made public on the Transparency Register. The Ombudsman can only conclude that these meetings took place at a level lower than director-general, although the identity of participants is not known. 

[22] The inquiry showed that, in 2020 and 2021, the Commission received merely 19 public access to documents requests concerning meetings with tobacco interest representatives.

[23] See: https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/tobacco-and-the-who-framework-convention-on-tobacco-control#.

[24] See Recommendation 2.2 recommends “disclosure of records of [tobacco industry] interactions to the public”.

[25] Available here: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/doc/correspondence/en/79435.

[26] This requirement was set out in a ‘Note to the Management Team’ by the director-general of DG SANTE. See: https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/7922/response/26900/attach/2/DG%20SANTE%20note%20to%20management%20team%20final.pdf?cookie_passthrough=1.

[27] Reply from the Commissioner for Agriculture of 15 May 2020 to a transnational tobacco company.

[28] Case C-160/20, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=184A5AC2A84062071234501852AE1054?text=&docid=254381&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=290831.

[29] As is stated in recital 7 of Directive 2014/40 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products, see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AJOL_2014_127_R_0001.